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Device to implement precommitment by restricting one's future options
A commitment device is a mechanism or arrangement that implements precommitment by deliberately restricting one’s own future options in order to make
Commitment_device
Mathematical game
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Guess_2/3_of_the_average
Human behavior pattern in which the participant takes on increasing risk
Escalation of commitment is a pattern of decision-making in which individuals or groups continue to invest in a chosen course of action despite mounting
Escalation_of_commitment
Logical paradox in decision-making theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Paradox_of_tolerance
American internet company
users to make commitment contracts in order to reach their personal goals. stickK users set up a "commitment contract", a commitment device where they agree
StickK
Decision rule used for minimizing the possible loss for a worst-case scenario
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Minimax
Solution concept of a non-cooperative game
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Nash_equilibrium
Paper-and-pencil game for two players
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Tic-tac-toe
Search algorithm
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Alpha–beta_pruning
Concept in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Shapley_value
Situation where total gains match total losses
assign probabilities to their respective actions, and then use a random device which, according to these probabilities, chooses an action for them. Each
Zero-sum_game
Type of stable matching problem
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Stable_roommates_problem
Concept in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Focal_point_(game_theory)
Israeli-American psychologist and economist (1934–2024)
could not be more important, namely, that human reason left to its own devices is apt to engage in a number of fallacies and systematic errors, so if
Daniel_Kahneman
Standard example in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Prisoner's_dilemma
Two-player coordination game in game theory
observed randomizing device, then they might decide to correlate their strategies in the game based on the outcome of the device. For example, if the
Battle of the sexes (game theory)
Battle_of_the_sexes_(game_theory)
Game whose outcome can be correctly predicted
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Solved_game
Hand game for two players or more
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Rock_paper_scissors
Hand game for two or more players
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Chopsticks_(hand_game)
English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation"
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Tit_for_tat
Weakly optimal allocation of resources
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Pareto_efficiency
Resource distribution game
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Blotto_game
Condition in economics and game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Perfect_information
Tendency to overestimate in auctions
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Winner's_curse
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
List_of_games_in_game_theory
Game illustrating paradox in rational choice theory
average).[citation needed] All-pay auction Bidding fee auction Escalation of commitment Tragedy of the commons War of attrition (game) Shubik: 1971. Page 109
Dollar_auction
Quality of a strategy in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Strategic_dominance
Game theory scenario
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Win–win_game
Political model of international conflict resolution
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Two-level_game_theory
Situation where all parties are worse off
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
No-win_situation
Finding an optimal algorithm for playing chess
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Solving_chess
Game theory concept
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Subgame_perfect_equilibrium
Variation of minimax game tree search
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Negamax
Zero-sum game where competitions between strategies contain a cycle
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Intransitive_game
Making of satisfactory, not optimal, decisions
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Bounded_rationality
Poker game developed by Harold Kuhn
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Kuhn_poker
Simple mathematical game
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Pirate_game
Game theory case weighing own/others' sacrifice
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Volunteer's_dilemma
Representation of a game in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Normal-form_game
Concept in conflict studies
and armed conflict Conflict continuum Conflict management Escalation of commitment Friedrich Glasl's model of conflict escalation Stability–instability paradox
Conflict_escalation
Pairing where no unchosen pair prefers each other over their choice
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Stable_matching_problem
Mathematical models of strategic interactions
formation. A game is cooperative if players are able to form binding commitments externally enforced (e.g. through contract law). A game is non-cooperative
Game_theory
Conflict between safety and cooperation
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Stag_hunt
Transactional view of violent conflict in international relations theory
due to uncertainty and commitment problems. As a result, provision of reliable information and steps to alleviate commitment problems make war less likely
Bargaining_model_of_war
Concept in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Incentive_compatibility
Theorem in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Aumann's_agreement_theorem
Paradox of combining strategies
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Parrondo's_paradox
Problem in process of sharing surplus
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Cooperative_bargaining
Overuse of a shared resource
1172133. PMID 19628857. S2CID 39710673. Rachlin, H.; Green, L. (1972). "Commitment, choice, and self-control". Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior
Tragedy_of_the_commons
Trigger strategy
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Grim_trigger
Game-theoretic concept
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Cheap_talk
time. Another example is to build excess production capacity as a commitment device. Due to the often ambiguous nature of cost in production, it may be
Limit_price
Model of humans as rational, self-interested agents
build into its assumptions the notion that people can give credible commitments to a course of conduct. He demonstrates the absurdity with the narrowness
Homo_economicus
When a decision-maker's future preferences can contradict earlier preferences
subgame imperfect. In this context, the inconsistency is primarily about commitment and credible threats. This manifests itself through a violation of Bellman's
Dynamic_inconsistency
Simple game studied in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Matching_pennies
Hungarian and American mathematician and physicist (1903–1957)
function to be placed at any position in the causal chain from the measurement device to the "subjective consciousness" of the human observer. In other words
John_von_Neumann
Model of conflict for two players in game theory
Russians sought to deter American attack by building a "doomsday machine", a device that would trigger world annihilation if Russia was hit by nuclear weapons
Chicken_(game)
Solution concept in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Evolutionarily stable strategy
Evolutionarily_stable_strategy
American economist (born 1939)
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Samuel_Bowles_(economist)
In board games that cannot end in a draw, one of the two players has a winning strategy
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Zermelo's theorem (game theory)
Zermelo's_theorem_(game_theory)
Level of information in economics and game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Complete_information
Facilitating a peaceful outcome to a dispute
in health. Collaborating may be the best solution when consensus and commitment of other parties is important; when the conflict occurs in a collaborative
Conflict_resolution
Preference of known risks to unknown risks
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Ambiguity_aversion
Love focused on feelings
love—in the sense of "being in love", or passionate love—evolved as a "commitment device" which overrides rationality to suppress the search for alternative
Romance
Hungarian-American economist and philosopher (1920–2000)
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
John_Harsanyi
Israeli psychologist (1937–1996)
under uncertainty whether they like it or not..... Man is a deterministic device thrown into a probabilistic Universe. In this match, surprises are expected
Amos_Tversky
Problem in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
El_Farol_Bar_problem
Proof all ranked voting rules have spoilers
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Arrow's_impossibility_theorem
Type of signaling game
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Lewis_signaling_game
Combinatorial game theory theorem
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Sprague–Grundy_theorem
Concept in economics and game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Global_game
Economic phenomenon
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Tyranny_of_small_decisions
Complete plan on how a game player will behave in every possible game situation
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Strategy_(game_theory)
Experimental tool
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Dictator_game
Class of theorems about Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games
equilibrium. Many other folk theorems have been proved in settings with commitment. In mathematics, the term folk theorem refers generally to any theorem
Folk_theorem_(game_theory)
Simultaneous game found in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Coordination_game
Economic model of competition
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Bertrand_competition
Problem about bus travel
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Wait/walk_dilemma
Dynamical system
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Replicator_equation
Refinement of Nash equilibrium
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Sequential_equilibrium
Concept in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Fictitious_play
Term in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Move_by_nature
Israeli-American mathematician (born 1930)
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Robert_Aumann
Concept in economics and game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Price_of_anarchy
Concept in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Best_response
Economic model
More generally, the leader must have commitment power. Moving observably first is the most obvious means of commitment: once the leader has made its move
Stackelberg_competition
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Contingent_cooperator
Game with a dominant mutually most beneficial action
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Deadlock_(game_theory)
Variant of Nash equilibrium in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Trembling_hand_perfect_equilibrium
are that it involves a commitment from the player, meaning the player can only restrict their own choices and that the commitment has to be credible, meaning
Strategic_move
Game that repeats a base game
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Repeated_game
Israeli economist
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Ariel_Rubinstein
Aircraft component fixed to the end of the wings to improve performance
Wingtip devices are intended to improve the efficiency of fixed-wing aircraft by reducing drag. Although there are several types of wing tip devices which
Wingtip_device
Class of games where players choose their actions sequentially
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Sequential_game
English mathematician and game theorist (born 1940)
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Kenneth_Binmore
Game theory dilemma
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Unscrupulous_diner's_dilemma
Diplomatic policy of concessions
Nationalist faction (Germany and Italy) could not have broken a non-binding commitment, and they walked out at least once. The Republic was not even allowed
Appeasement
Economic model
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Cournot_competition
Algorithm in game theory
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Paranoid_algorithm
Two-player extensive form game
Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim
Centipede_game
travel, tourism, insurance
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travel, tourism, insurance