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COMMITMENT DEVICE

  • Commitment device
  • Device to implement precommitment by restricting one's future options

    A commitment device is a mechanism or arrangement that implements precommitment by deliberately restricting one’s own future options in order to make

    Commitment device

    Commitment device

    Commitment_device

  • Guess 2/3 of the average
  • Mathematical game

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Guess 2/3 of the average

    Guess_2/3_of_the_average

  • Escalation of commitment
  • Human behavior pattern in which the participant takes on increasing risk

    Escalation of commitment is a pattern of decision-making in which individuals or groups continue to invest in a chosen course of action despite mounting

    Escalation of commitment

    Escalation_of_commitment

  • Paradox of tolerance
  • Logical paradox in decision-making theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Paradox of tolerance

    Paradox of tolerance

    Paradox_of_tolerance

  • StickK
  • American internet company

    users to make commitment contracts in order to reach their personal goals. stickK users set up a "commitment contract", a commitment device where they agree

    StickK

    StickK

  • Tic-tac-toe
  • Paper-and-pencil game for two players

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Tic-tac-toe

    Tic-tac-toe

    Tic-tac-toe

  • Minimax
  • Decision rule used for minimizing the possible loss for a worst-case scenario

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Minimax

    Minimax

  • Nash equilibrium
  • Solution concept of a non-cooperative game

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Nash equilibrium

    Nash_equilibrium

  • Alpha–beta pruning
  • Search algorithm

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Alpha–beta pruning

    Alpha–beta_pruning

  • Shapley value
  • Concept in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Shapley value

    Shapley value

    Shapley_value

  • Zero-sum game
  • Situation where total gains match total losses

    assign probabilities to their respective actions, and then use a random device which, according to these probabilities, chooses an action for them. Each

    Zero-sum game

    Zero-sum_game

  • Stable roommates problem
  • Type of stable matching problem

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Stable roommates problem

    Stable_roommates_problem

  • Focal point (game theory)
  • Concept in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Focal point (game theory)

    Focal_point_(game_theory)

  • Daniel Kahneman
  • Israeli-American psychologist and economist (1934–2024)

    could not be more important, namely, that human reason left to its own devices is apt to engage in a number of fallacies and systematic errors, so if

    Daniel Kahneman

    Daniel Kahneman

    Daniel_Kahneman

  • Prisoner's dilemma
  • Standard example in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Prisoner's dilemma

    Prisoner's_dilemma

  • Solved game
  • Game whose outcome can be correctly predicted

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Solved game

    Solved_game

  • Battle of the sexes (game theory)
  • Two-player coordination game in game theory

    observed randomizing device, then they might decide to correlate their strategies in the game based on the outcome of the device. For example, if the

    Battle of the sexes (game theory)

    Battle_of_the_sexes_(game_theory)

  • Rock paper scissors
  • Hand game for two players or more

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Rock paper scissors

    Rock paper scissors

    Rock_paper_scissors

  • Chopsticks (hand game)
  • Hand game for two or more players

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Chopsticks (hand game)

    Chopsticks (hand game)

    Chopsticks_(hand_game)

  • Tit for tat
  • English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation"

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Tit for tat

    Tit for tat

    Tit_for_tat

  • Perfect information
  • Condition in economics and game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Perfect information

    Perfect information

    Perfect_information

  • Pareto efficiency
  • Weakly optimal allocation of resources

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Pareto efficiency

    Pareto_efficiency

  • Blotto game
  • Resource distribution game

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Blotto game

    Blotto_game

  • Win–win game
  • Game theory scenario

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Win–win game

    Win–win_game

  • Dollar auction
  • Game illustrating paradox in rational choice theory

    average).[citation needed] All-pay auction Bidding fee auction Escalation of commitment Tragedy of the commons War of attrition (game) Shubik: 1971. Page 109

    Dollar auction

    Dollar_auction

  • Winner's curse
  • Tendency to overestimate in auctions

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Winner's curse

    Winner's curse

    Winner's_curse

  • List of games in game theory
  • Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    List of games in game theory

    List_of_games_in_game_theory

  • Strategic dominance
  • Quality of a strategy in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Strategic dominance

    Strategic_dominance

  • Two-level game theory
  • Political model of international conflict resolution

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Two-level game theory

    Two-level game theory

    Two-level_game_theory

  • No-win situation
  • Situation where all parties are worse off

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    No-win situation

    No-win_situation

  • Subgame perfect equilibrium
  • Game theory concept

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Subgame perfect equilibrium

    Subgame_perfect_equilibrium

  • Solving chess
  • Finding an optimal algorithm for playing chess

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Solving chess

    Solving_chess

  • Intransitive game
  • Zero-sum game where competitions between strategies contain a cycle

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Intransitive game

    Intransitive_game

  • Negamax
  • Variation of minimax game tree search

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Negamax

    Negamax

  • Kuhn poker
  • Poker game developed by Harold Kuhn

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Kuhn poker

    Kuhn_poker

  • Bounded rationality
  • Making of satisfactory, not optimal, decisions

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Bounded rationality

    Bounded_rationality

  • Pirate game
  • Simple mathematical game

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Pirate game

    Pirate_game

  • Conflict escalation
  • Concept in conflict studies

    and armed conflict Conflict continuum Conflict management Escalation of commitment Friedrich Glasl's model of conflict escalation Stability–instability paradox

    Conflict escalation

    Conflict_escalation

  • Stable matching problem
  • Pairing where no unchosen pair prefers each other over their choice

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Stable matching problem

    Stable_matching_problem

  • Stag hunt
  • Conflict between safety and cooperation

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Stag hunt

    Stag_hunt

  • Normal-form game
  • Representation of a game in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Normal-form game

    Normal-form_game

  • Volunteer's dilemma
  • Game theory case weighing own/others' sacrifice

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Volunteer's dilemma

    Volunteer's_dilemma

  • Game theory
  • Mathematical models of strategic interactions

    formation. A game is cooperative if players are able to form binding commitments externally enforced (e.g. through contract law). A game is non-cooperative

    Game theory

    Game_theory

  • Incentive compatibility
  • Concept in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Incentive compatibility

    Incentive_compatibility

  • Bargaining model of war
  • Transactional view of violent conflict in international relations theory

    due to uncertainty and commitment problems. As a result, provision of reliable information and steps to alleviate commitment problems make war less likely

    Bargaining model of war

    Bargaining_model_of_war

  • Cooperative bargaining
  • Problem in process of sharing surplus

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Cooperative bargaining

    Cooperative_bargaining

  • Parrondo's paradox
  • Paradox of combining strategies

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Parrondo's paradox

    Parrondo's_paradox

  • Tragedy of the commons
  • Overuse of a shared resource

    1172133. PMID 19628857. S2CID 39710673. Rachlin, H.; Green, L. (1972). "Commitment, choice, and self-control". Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior

    Tragedy of the commons

    Tragedy of the commons

    Tragedy_of_the_commons

  • Limit price
  • time. Another example is to build excess production capacity as a commitment device. Due to the often ambiguous nature of cost in production, it may be

    Limit price

    Limit_price

  • Grim trigger
  • Trigger strategy

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Grim trigger

    Grim_trigger

  • Cheap talk
  • Game-theoretic concept

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Cheap talk

    Cheap_talk

  • Matching pennies
  • Simple game studied in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Matching pennies

    Matching pennies

    Matching_pennies

  • Dynamic inconsistency
  • When a decision-maker's future preferences can contradict earlier preferences

    subgame imperfect. In this context, the inconsistency is primarily about commitment and credible threats. This manifests itself through a violation of Bellman's

    Dynamic inconsistency

    Dynamic_inconsistency

  • Chicken (game)
  • Model of conflict for two players in game theory

    Russians sought to deter American attack by building a "doomsday machine", a device that would trigger world annihilation if Russia was hit by nuclear weapons

    Chicken (game)

    Chicken_(game)

  • Aumann's agreement theorem
  • Theorem in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Aumann's agreement theorem

    Aumann's_agreement_theorem

  • John von Neumann
  • Hungarian and American mathematician and physicist (1903–1957)

    function to be placed at any position in the causal chain from the measurement device to the "subjective consciousness" of the human observer. In other words

    John von Neumann

    John von Neumann

    John_von_Neumann

  • Complete information
  • Level of information in economics and game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Complete information

    Complete information

    Complete_information

  • Conflict resolution
  • Facilitating a peaceful outcome to a dispute

    in health. Collaborating may be the best solution when consensus and commitment of other parties is important; when the conflict occurs in a collaborative

    Conflict resolution

    Conflict_resolution

  • Zermelo's theorem (game theory)
  • In board games that cannot end in a draw, one of the two players has a winning strategy

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Zermelo's theorem (game theory)

    Zermelo's_theorem_(game_theory)

  • Amos Tversky
  • Israeli psychologist (1937–1996)

    under uncertainty whether they like it or not..... Man is a deterministic device thrown into a probabilistic Universe. In this match, surprises are expected

    Amos Tversky

    Amos_Tversky

  • Samuel Bowles (economist)
  • American economist (born 1939)

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Samuel Bowles (economist)

    Samuel Bowles (economist)

    Samuel_Bowles_(economist)

  • John Harsanyi
  • Hungarian-American economist and philosopher (1920–2000)

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    John Harsanyi

    John_Harsanyi

  • Romance
  • Love focused on feelings

    love—in the sense of "being in love", or passionate love—evolved as a "commitment device" which overrides rationality to suppress the search for alternative

    Romance

    Romance

    Romance

  • Homo economicus
  • Model of humans as rational, self-interested agents

    build into its assumptions the notion that people can give credible commitments to a course of conduct. He demonstrates the absurdity with the narrowness

    Homo economicus

    Homo_economicus

  • Robert Aumann
  • Israeli-American mathematician (born 1930)

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Robert Aumann

    Robert Aumann

    Robert_Aumann

  • Ambiguity aversion
  • Preference of known risks to unknown risks

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Ambiguity aversion

    Ambiguity_aversion

  • Arrow's impossibility theorem
  • Proof all ranked voting rules have spoilers

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Arrow's impossibility theorem

    Arrow's_impossibility_theorem

  • Evolutionarily stable strategy
  • Solution concept in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Evolutionarily stable strategy

    Evolutionarily_stable_strategy

  • Strategy (game theory)
  • Complete plan on how a game player will behave in every possible game situation

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Strategy (game theory)

    Strategy_(game_theory)

  • El Farol Bar problem
  • Problem in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    El Farol Bar problem

    El Farol Bar problem

    El_Farol_Bar_problem

  • Wait/walk dilemma
  • Problem about bus travel

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Wait/walk dilemma

    Wait/walk dilemma

    Wait/walk_dilemma

  • Sequential equilibrium
  • Refinement of Nash equilibrium

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Sequential equilibrium

    Sequential_equilibrium

  • Tyranny of small decisions
  • Economic phenomenon

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Tyranny of small decisions

    Tyranny_of_small_decisions

  • Sprague–Grundy theorem
  • Combinatorial game theory theorem

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Sprague–Grundy theorem

    Sprague–Grundy_theorem

  • Global game
  • Concept in economics and game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Global game

    Global_game

  • Lewis signaling game
  • Type of signaling game

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Lewis signaling game

    Lewis signaling game

    Lewis_signaling_game

  • Folk theorem (game theory)
  • Class of theorems about Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games

    equilibrium. Many other folk theorems have been proved in settings with commitment. In mathematics, the term folk theorem refers generally to any theorem

    Folk theorem (game theory)

    Folk_theorem_(game_theory)

  • Dictator game
  • Experimental tool

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Dictator game

    Dictator_game

  • Fictitious play
  • Concept in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Fictitious play

    Fictitious_play

  • Stackelberg competition
  • Economic model

    More generally, the leader must have commitment power. Moving observably first is the most obvious means of commitment: once the leader has made its move

    Stackelberg competition

    Stackelberg_competition

  • Bertrand competition
  • Economic model of competition

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Bertrand competition

    Bertrand_competition

  • Price of anarchy
  • Concept in economics and game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Price of anarchy

    Price_of_anarchy

  • Replicator equation
  • Dynamical system

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Replicator equation

    Replicator_equation

  • Contingent cooperator
  • Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Contingent cooperator

    Contingent_cooperator

  • Best response
  • Concept in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Best response

    Best_response

  • Move by nature
  • Term in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Move by nature

    Move by nature

    Move_by_nature

  • Deadlock (game theory)
  • Game with a dominant mutually most beneficial action

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Deadlock (game theory)

    Deadlock_(game_theory)

  • Repeated game
  • Game that repeats a base game

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Repeated game

    Repeated_game

  • Strategic move
  • are that it involves a commitment from the player, meaning the player can only restrict their own choices and that the commitment has to be credible, meaning

    Strategic move

    Strategic_move

  • Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
  • Variant of Nash equilibrium in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Trembling hand perfect equilibrium

    Trembling_hand_perfect_equilibrium

  • Coordination game
  • Simultaneous game found in game theory

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Coordination game

    Coordination_game

  • Wingtip device
  • Aircraft component fixed to the end of the wings to improve performance

    May 31, 2010. "Airbus launches "Sharklet" large wingtip devices for A320 Family with commitment from Air New Zealand". Airbus. November 15, 2009. Archived

    Wingtip device

    Wingtip device

    Wingtip_device

  • Sequential game
  • Class of games where players choose their actions sequentially

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Sequential game

    Sequential game

    Sequential_game

  • Kenneth Binmore
  • English mathematician and game theorist (born 1940)

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Kenneth Binmore

    Kenneth Binmore

    Kenneth_Binmore

  • Non-credible threat
  • Concept in game theory

    not be in his best interest to do so. A threat, and its counterpart – a commitment, are both defined by American economist and Nobel prize winner, T.C. Schelling

    Non-credible threat

    Non-credible threat

    Non-credible_threat

  • Centipede game
  • Two-player extensive form game

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Centipede game

    Centipede game

    Centipede_game

  • Symmetric equilibrium
  • Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Symmetric equilibrium

    Symmetric_equilibrium

  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • Israeli economist

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Ariel Rubinstein

    Ariel Rubinstein

    Ariel_Rubinstein

  • Public goods game
  • Experimental economics game

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Public goods game

    Public goods game

    Public_goods_game

  • Cournot competition
  • Economic model

    Appeasement Bargaining model of war Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim

    Cournot competition

    Cournot_competition

Searches for online references containing COMMITMENT DEVICE

COMMITMENT DEVICE

Search references containing COMMITMENT DEVICE

COMMITMENT DEVICE

  • Gaines
  • Surname or Lastname

    English (of Norman origin)

    Gaines

    English (of Norman origin) : nickname for a crafty or ingenious person, from a reduced form of Old French engaine ‘ingenuity’, ‘trickery’ (Latin ingenium ‘native wit’). The word was also used in a concrete sense of a stratagem or device, particularly a trap.This surname has also assimilated reduced variants of Welsh Gurganus.

    Gaines

  • Yukti
  • Girl/Female

    Gujarati, Hindu, Indian, Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Telugu

    Yukti

    Strategy; Idea; Trick; Solution; A Device; Planning

    Yukti

  • Uhud |
  • Girl/Female

    Muslim

    Uhud |

    Commitment, Pledge, Delegation

    Uhud |

  • Uhud
  • Girl/Female

    Arabic, Muslim

    Uhud

    Commitment; Pledge; Delegation

    Uhud

  • Trick
  • Surname or Lastname

    English (southwest and South Wales)

    Trick

    English (southwest and South Wales) : metonymic nickname for a cunning or crafty person, from Middle English trick ‘strategem’, ‘device’ (from a Norman form of Old French triche).

    Trick

  • Organ
  • Surname or Lastname

    English

    Organ

    English : metonymic occupational name for a player of a musical instrument (any musical instrument, not necessarily what is now known as an organ), from Middle English organ (Old French organe, Late Latin organum ‘device’, ‘(musical) instrument’, Greek organon ‘tool’, from ergein ‘to work or do’).English : from a rare medieval personal name, attested only in the Latinized forms Organus (masculine) and Organa (feminine). Its etymology is obscure; it may be a reworking of a Celtic name.French : habitational name from a place in the Hautes Pyrénées named Organ.

    Organ

  • WINDSOR
  • Male

    English

    WINDSOR

    English surname transferred to forename use, from a place name in Berkshire originally called Windels-ora, WINDSOR means "landing place with a windlass." [note: windlass. naut. a device used for winding ropes.] 

    WINDSOR

  • Jenner
  • Surname or Lastname

    English (chiefly Kent and Sussex)

    Jenner

    English (chiefly Kent and Sussex) : occupational name for a designer or engineer, from a Middle English reduced form of Old French engineor ‘contriver’ (a derivative of engaigne ‘cunning’, ‘ingenuity’, ‘stratagem’, ‘device’). Engineers in the Middle Ages were primarily designers and builders of military machines, although in peacetime they might turn their hands to architecture and other more pacific functions.German : from the Latin personal name Januarius (see January 1). Jänner is a South German word for ‘January’, and so it is possible that this is one of the surnames acquired from words denoting months of the year, for example by converts who had been baptized in that month, people who were born or baptized in that month, or people whose taxes were due in January.

    Jenner

  • Harpham
  • Surname or Lastname

    English

    Harpham

    English : habitational name from a place in East Yorkshire near Bridlington, so named from Old English hearpe ‘harp’ (the instrument or the device used for purifying sea salt) + hām ‘homestead’.

    Harpham

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