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Solution concept in game theory
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (or set of strategies) that is impermeable when adopted by a population in adaptation to a specific
Evolutionarily stable strategy
Evolutionarily_stable_strategy
A weak evolutionarily stable strategy (WESS) is a more broad form of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Like ESS, a WESS is able to defend against an
Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Weak_evolutionarily_stable_strategy
Condition where selection restores genetic composition
stability. While related to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), evolutionarily stable states are not identical and the two terms cannot
Evolutionarily_stable_state
Set of strategies in game theory
In game theory an evolutionarily stable set (ES set), sometimes referred to as evolutionary stable sets, is a set of strategies, which score equally against
Evolutionarily_stable_set
Model of conflict for two players in game theory
chooses between the two pure strategies. Either the pure, or mixed, Nash equilibria will be evolutionarily stable strategies depending upon whether uncorrelated
Chicken_(game)
Decision rule used for minimizing the possible loss for a worst-case scenario
players will realize the difficulty of making a choice. So a more stable strategy is needed. Some choices are dominated by others and can be eliminated:
Minimax
Game theory model of aggression
model was originally formulated by John Maynard Smith; a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was determined by Bishop & Cannings. An example is a second
War_of_attrition_(game)
Pairing where no unchosen pair prefers each other over their choice
mathematics, economics, and computer science, the stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized sets of elements
Stable_matching_problem
Application of game theory to evolving populations in biology
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies with Two Types of Players J. Appl. Prob. 16, 76–83. Taylor, P. D., and Jonker, L. B. (1978). Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
Evolutionary_game_theory
Standard example in game theory
been shown that unfair ZD strategies are not evolutionarily stable. The key intuition is that an evolutionarily stable strategy must not only be able to
Prisoner's_dilemma
different mating strategies to achieve reproductive success. The result over time is a variety of evolutionarily stable strategies and phenotypes, consisting
Alternative_mating_strategy
Solution concept of a non-cooperative game
there is a stable average frequency with which each pure strategy is employed by the average member of the appropriate population, then this stable average
Nash_equilibrium
Hungarian and American mathematician and physicist (1903–1957)
Uchaikin, Vladimir V.; Zolotarev, Vladimir M. (1999). Chance and Stability: Stable Distributions and their Applications. De Gruyter. pp. xviii, 281, 424. doi:10
John_von_Neumann
Mathematical models of strategic interactions
largely as a result of the work of John Maynard Smith and his evolutionarily stable strategy. In addition, the concepts of correlated equilibrium, trembling
Game_theory
Overuse of a shared resource
these classes and distinguish between psychological individual differences (stable personality traits) and situational factors (the environment). Situational
Tragedy_of_the_commons
Hand game for two players or more
& Walker, Graham (2004) The Official Rock Paper Scissors Strategy Guide. Fireside. (strategy, tips and culture from the World Rock Paper Scissors Society)
Rock_paper_scissors
Complete plan on how a game player will behave in every possible game situation
extended form games. Nash equilibrium Haven (graph theory) Evolutionarily stable strategy Ben Polak Game Theory: Lecture 1 Transcript ECON 159, 5 September
Strategy_(game_theory)
Mathematical modelling of phenotypic evolution
where finite evolutionary steps lead past the local 'flatness'. Second, a fitness maximum which is known as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and which
Evolutionary invasion analysis
Evolutionary_invasion_analysis
Quality of a strategy in game theory
In game theory, a strategy A dominates another strategy B if A will always produce a better result than B, regardless of how any other player plays. Some
Strategic_dominance
Simultaneous game found in game theory
Unlike the pure Nash equilibria, the mixed equilibrium is not an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). The mixed Nash equilibrium is also Pareto dominated by
Coordination_game
Conflict between safety and cooperation
two pure strategy Nash equilibria, that is, stable attractors where an individual player can't improve their position with a different strategy if the other
Stag_hunt
Weakly optimal allocation of resources
way possible. In terms of game theory, a strategy profile s is Pareto efficient when there is no other strategy profile s′ such that ui(s′) ≥ ui(s) for
Pareto_efficiency
Search algorithm
Since the minimax algorithm and its variants are inherently depth-first, a strategy such as iterative deepening is usually used in conjunction with alpha–beta
Alpha–beta_pruning
Modelling evolution using differential equations
applications across evolutionary biology. An important concept of evolutionary game theory as applied in biology is the evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. This
Evolutionary_dynamics
Logical paradox in decision-making theory
Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 86(344), 346–359. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30091841 Blumner, Robyn E. (August–September 2016). "Is My Intolerance of
Paradox_of_tolerance
Paper-and-pencil game for two players
often played by young children who may not have discovered the optimal strategy. Because of the simplicity of tic-tac-toe, it is often used as a pedagogical
Tic-tac-toe
Formal rule for predicting how a game will be played
Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition.[1] Hines, W. G. S. (1987) Evolutionary stable strategies: a review of basic theory. Theoretical Population Biology 31:195–272
Solution_concept
Academic discipline
initial states, Quantum entanglement of initial states, Superposition of strategies to be used on the initial states. This theory is based on the physics
Quantum_game_theory
Situation where total gains match total losses
point-loss independent of the opponent's strategy. This leads to a linear programming problem with the optimal strategies for each player. This minimax method
Zero-sum_game
Concept in game theory
know which one of them is which, then the mixed Nash is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), as play is confined to the bottom left to top right diagonal
Best_response
Diplomatic policy of concessions
War as a "post revisionist" study. Appeasement was a crisis management strategy seeking a peaceful settlement of Hitler's grievances. "Chamberlain's worst
Appeasement
Study of the evolutionary basis for animal behavior due to ecological pressures
behaviors such as this, it can evolve a stable pattern of behaviors known as an evolutionarily stable strategy (or ESS). This term, derived from economic
Behavioral_ecology
Facilitating a peaceful outcome to a dispute
necessary for survival, giving it a strong evolutionary value. A further focus of this is among species that have stable social units, individual relationships
Conflict_resolution
Israeli-American psychologist and economist (1934–2024)
state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken
Daniel_Kahneman
Solution concept for non-cooperative games
strategies and payoffs. Decomposition and Player Splitting. The stable sets of the product of two independent games are the products of their stable sets
Mertens-stable_equilibrium
Concept in game theory involving long-term strategic planning
adaptation, where strategies adjust based on immediate fitness. A farsighted strategy might aim for an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) that withstands
Farsightedness_(game_theory)
Game theory concept
(non-Bayesian) game, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if every player's strategy is a best response to the other players' strategies. In this situation
Bayesian_game
Decrease in severity of conflicts
place in 1983. In war-time diplomacy, de-escalation is used as an exit strategy, sometimes called an "off-ramp" or "slip road". In such cases, an alternative
De-escalation
Branch of game theory about two-player sequential games with perfect information
analysis of game complexity and the existence of optimal strategies through methods like the strategy-stealing argument. Combinatorial game theory arose in
Combinatorial_game_theory
Type of stable matching problem
combinatorial game theory and algorithms, the stable-roommate problem (SRP) is the problem of finding a stable matching for an even-sized set. A matching
Stable_roommates_problem
1976 book by Richard Dawkins
Smith’s evolutionarily stable strategy, "a strategy which, if most members of a population adopt it, cannot be bettered by an alternative strategy … once
The_Selfish_Gene
Human behavior pattern in which the participant takes on increasing risk
when subjects view current issues as having unstable reasoning rather than stable reasoning, or when the individual is unwilling to admit mistakes. They then
Escalation_of_commitment
Point in evolutionary space where selection always leads
selection, such as an evolutionarily stable strategy, other possibilities are available. Because identification of an evolutionary attractor on its own
Evolutionary_attractor
Theory in evolutionary biology
Mathematical models describe how signalling can contribute to an evolutionarily stable strategy. Signals are given in contexts such as mate selection by females
Signalling_theory
Class of theorems about Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games
player's choices in the prior iterations. A choice of strategy for each of the players is a strategy profile, and it leads to a payout profile for the repeated
Folk_theorem_(game_theory)
Game theory scenario
state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken
Win–win_game
Field in social science
Appeasement in a strategy of making political, material, or territorial concessions to an aggressive power to avoid conflict. Deterrence is a strategy to use threats
Peace_and_conflict_studies
Game in economic experiments
can adopt a strategy that rejects unfair splits often enough to induce the proposer to always make a fair offer. Any change in strategy by the proposer
Ultimatum_game
Solution concept in game theory
are also somewhat rational, i.e. that they do not play dominated strategies. A strategy is rationalizable if there exists some possible set of beliefs both
Rationalizable_strategy
Hand game for two or more players
combinatorial game, and is solved in the sense that, with perfect play, an optimal strategy from any point is known. In Chopsticks, players tally points using the
Chopsticks_(hand_game)
Concept in game theory
introduced by the American economist Thomas Schelling in his book The Strategy of Conflict (1960). Schelling states that "[p]eople can often concert their
Focal_point_(game_theory)
Subfield of set theory
the other player of a game has a winning strategy, and the consequences of the existence of such strategies. Alternatively and similarly, "determinacy"
Determinacy
Game where groups of players may enforce cooperative behaviour
unique vector. The core is contained in any stable set, and if the core is stable it is the unique stable set; see (Driessen 1988) for a proof. For simple
Cooperative_game_theory
unilaterally change their strategy. Considering only situations where players play a single strategy without randomizing (a pure strategy) a game can have any
List_of_games_in_game_theory
Dynamical system
ISBN 978-0-674-02338-3. Alboszta, Jan; Miękisz, Jacek (2004). "Stability of evolutionarily stable strategies in discrete replicator dynamicswithtimedelay". Journal of Theoretical
Replicator_equation
Proof all ranked voting rules have spoilers
to occur in practice. Holliday, Wesley H.; Pacuit, Eric (2023-03-14). "Stable Voting". Constitutional Political Economy. 34 (3): 421–433. arXiv:2108.00542
Arrow's_impossibility_theorem
Model of humans as rational, self-interested agents
discussion. In its standard formulation, the model assumes that individuals have stable preferences, access to relevant information, and seek to maximize utility
Homo_economicus
Political model of international conflict resolution
state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken
Two-level_game_theory
Level of information in economics and game theory
participants. The utility functions (including risk aversion), payoffs, strategies and "types" of players are thus common knowledge. Complete information
Complete_information
Concept in game theory
state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken
Shapley_value
Game whose outcome can be correctly predicted
both players play perfectly. This concept is usually applied to abstract strategy games, and especially to games with full information and no element of
Solved_game
Neologism for cooperative competition
term is a portmanteau of "cooperation" and "competition". In business strategy, coopetition can involve companies collaborating in areas like research
Coopetition
When a decision-maker's future preferences can contradict earlier preferences
JSTOR 1885679. Simaan, M.; Cruz, J. B. Jr. (1973a). "On the Stackelberg Strategy in Nonzero-Sum Games". Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Dynamic_inconsistency
Class of strategies employed in a repeated non-cooperative game
theory, a trigger strategy is any of a class of strategies employed in a repeated non-cooperative game. A player using a trigger strategy initially cooperates
Trigger_strategy
Situation where all parties are worse off
state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken
No-win_situation
Economic model of competition
to find out a solution in pure strategies in Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs. Ha has defined the Myopic Stable Set (MSS)for Normal-form games
Bertrand_competition
2008 book by Jaroslav Flegr
speciation. It also draws upon John Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy. Biologist Brian K. Hall described the book as broad and integrative
Frozen_Evolution
Notion in combinatorial game theory
quantity; but it is usually known to be linear). The depth-first minimax strategy will use computation time proportional to the game's tree-complexity (since
Game_complexity
Condition in economics and game theory
implies common knowledge of each agent's utility functions, payoffs, strategies and "types". A system with perfect information may or may not have complete
Perfect_information
Bishop–Cannings theorem is a theorem in evolutionary game theory. It states that (i) all members of a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) have the same payoff
Bishop–Cannings_theorem
Game class in game theory
{\displaystyle m} . The receiver's strategy is a choice of P r o b ( a | m ) . {\displaystyle Prob(a|m).} The sender's strategy is a choice of P r o b ( m |
Signaling_game
the Evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. As the authors argued, "Beliefs determine Behavior. Behavior determines payoff. From an evolutionary perspective
Conjectural_variation
Paradox of combining strategies
in game theory, describes how a combination of losing strategies can become a winning strategy. It is named after its creator, Juan Parrondo, who discovered
Parrondo's_paradox
Poker game developed by Harold Kuhn
the other player). The game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; when both players play equilibrium strategies, the first player should expect to lose
Kuhn_poker
Problem in process of sharing surplus
neither player can increase their return by unilaterally changing their strategy. In Rubinstein's alternating offers bargaining game, players take turns
Cooperative_bargaining
Proposed mechanism of evolution
different groups, each with a different evolutionarily stable strategy, there is selection between the different strategies, since some are worse than others
Group_selection
Israeli psychologist (1937–1996)
state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken
Amos_Tversky
Informal understanding of acceptable conduct
calculations. Others see social norms emerging as part of an evolutionarily stable strategy, where they stabilize through third-party punishment. Three
Social_norm
Economic model
equilibrium or equilibria (SPNE), i.e. the strategy profile that serves best each player, given the strategies of the other player and that entails every
Stackelberg_competition
Economic phenomenon
inappropriate levels can introduce. Creeping normality Externality Fabian strategy Fredkin's paradox Free rider problem Greedy algorithm Law of triviality
Tyranny_of_small_decisions
Making of satisfactory, not optimal, decisions
seen when comparing the cognitive strategies utilised in simple situations (e.g. tic-tac-toe), in comparison to strategies utilised in difficult situations
Bounded_rationality
Field of economics and game theory
such a setting because it involves solving for agents' best-response strategies and for the best inference from a possible strategic lie. Thanks to a
Mechanism_design
Concept in game theory
\varepsilon >0} there is a positive integer N {\displaystyle N} and a strategy pair σ ε {\displaystyle \sigma _{\varepsilon }} of player 1 and τ ε {\displaystyle
Stochastic_game
punishments are the essence of social norms, as they are an evolutionarily stable strategy, unlike second-party punishments. It has also been shown that
Third-party_punishment
Evolutionary model that explains the sex ratio
equilibrium ratio. In modern language, the 1:1 ratio is the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Fisher wrote the explanation described by Eric Charnov
Fisher's_principle
Simple mathematical game
state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken
Pirate_game
Finding an optimal algorithm for playing chess
Solving chess consists of finding an optimal strategy for the game of chess; that is, one by which one of the players (White or Black) can always force
Solving_chess
Set in game theory
coalition having at least (n+1)/2 members has an empty core. That is, no stable coalition exists. Consider a group of n miners, who have discovered large
Core_(game_theory)
Variation of minimax game tree search
state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken
Negamax
Economic model
and then behaves as a monopoly. The state of equilibrium... is therefore stable; i.e., if either of the producers, misled as to his true interest, leaves
Cournot_competition
Representation of a game in game theory
players' strategy spaces and payoff functions. A strategy space for a player is the set of all strategies available to that player, whereas a strategy is a
Normal-form_game
English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation"
recorded in 1558. It is also a highly effective strategy in game theory. An agent using this strategy will first cooperate, then subsequently replicate
Tit_for_tat
Topics referred to by the same term
nuclear research facility Euthyroid sick syndrome Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Explained sum of squares Effective sample size
ESS
Preference of known risks to unknown risks
the range 60-260. For some values of x, the safe strategy (option R) is dominated by a mixed strategy of L and M, and thus would not be played in a Nash
Ambiguity_aversion
Problem of sharing resources
fair division procedure be strategyproof, i.e. it should be a dominant strategy for the participants to report their true valuations. This requirement
Fair_division
Combinatorial game theory theorem
has a winning strategy for A + G + H {\displaystyle A+G+H} : respond to moves in A {\displaystyle A} according to their winning strategy for A {\displaystyle
Sprague–Grundy_theorem
Experimental tool
CiteSeerX 10.1.1.47.229. doi:10.1007/s001820050072. S2CID 6044302. Watson, Joel. Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. Vol. 139. New York. Camerer, Colin; Thaler
Dictator_game
Two-player coordination game in game theory
pure strategy Nash equilibria, one where both players go to the prize fight, and another where both go to the ballet. There is also a mixed strategy Nash
Battle of the sexes (game theory)
Battle_of_the_sexes_(game_theory)
Strategy which only depends on the current state of a game
In game theory, a Markov strategy is a strategy that depends only on the current state of the game, rather than the full history of past actions. The state
Markov_strategy
Resource distribution game
optimal strategies can be explicitly found. In addition to military strategy applications, the Colonel Blotto game has applications to political strategy (resource
Blotto_game
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY
Surname or Lastname
English, Dutch, North German, and Danish
English, Dutch, North German, and Danish : variant of Stubbe.
Surname or Lastname
English (Durham)
English (Durham) : unexplained
Surname or Lastname
English
English : occupational name for someone who looked after horses or cattle, from an agent derivative of Middle English stable ‘stable’.German (Stäbler) : occupational name for an official who carried a staff as a symbol of office, Middle High German stebelære.
Boy/Male
Tamil
Stable
Female
English
Feminine variant spelling of English unisex Stacey, STACEE means "resurrection."
Female
English
Feminine variant spelling of English unisex Stacey, STACIE means "resurrection."
Boy/Male
Vietnamese
Stable.
Surname or Lastname
English
English : topographic name for someone who lived by a stable, or an occupational name for someone employed in one, from Middle English stable, plural stables (via Old French from Latin stabulum, a derivative of stare ‘to stand’). In Middle English the term was used of the quarters occupied by cattle as well as those reserved for horses.
Surname or Lastname
English
English : variant of Staple.
Female
English
English name derived from the vocabulary word, SABLE means "black," as a heraldic color. It is sometimes confused with the mammal of the same name but which has brown fur, not black, and which has a different origin.
Boy/Male
Shakespearean American English
Henry VI, Part 2' Sir John Stanley. 'King Henry the Sixth, Part III' Sir William Stanley. 'King...
Boy/Male
Hindu
Stable
Male
French
French name derived from Latin amabilis, AMABLE means "lovable."
Boy/Male
Indian, Sanskrit
Stable
Female
English
Variant spelling of English Mabel, MABLE means "lovable."Â
Surname or Lastname
English (Devon and Cornwall)
English (Devon and Cornwall) : habitational name from Scoble in Devon.
Surname or Lastname
English
English : topographic name for someone who lived near a boundary post, from Middle English stapel ‘post’ + the suffix -er, denoting an inhabitant.
Boy/Male
Indian, Punjabi, Sikh
Stable
Female
English
Elaborated form of English Star, STARLA means "star."
Surname or Lastname
English
English : from Middle English stapel ‘post’, hence a topographic name for someone who lived near a boundary post, or a habitational name from some place named with this word (Old English stapel), as for example Staple in Kent or Staple Fitzpaine in Somerset.Americanized spelling of German Stapel.
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY
Boy/Male
Indian, Sanskrit
Sole Leader; Lord Shiva
Boy/Male
Arabic, Hindu, Indian, Kannada, Marathi, Muslim, Telugu
Reinforcement
Female
English
Variant spelling of English Jules, JOOLS means "descended from Jupiter (Jove)."
Boy/Male
Hindu, Indian, Marathi
Buddha
Boy/Male
Tamil
Boy/Male
Biblical
Separation, departure, an almond.
Biblical
selling; knowing
Boy/Male
Gujarati, Hindu, Indian
Brave
Surname or Lastname
English (mainly Bristol and Gwent)
English (mainly Bristol and Gwent) : of uncertain origin, apparently a habitational name from some lost or unidentified place deriving its name from Old English seolfor ‘silver’ + þorn ‘thorn bush’.
Surname or Lastname
French
French : habitational name from a place so named, for example in Dordogne, Gironde, and Marne.English : variant of Verdun.A Verdon, also written Verdun, from the Aunis region of France was documented in Quebec City in 1663.
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY
v. t.
To sort according to its staple; as, to staple cotton.
v. i.
Durable; not subject to overthrow or change; firm; as, a stable foundation; a stable position.
a.
Relating to evolution; as, evolutionary discussions.
imp. & p. p.
of Stale
a.
Not stable; not standing fast or firm; unstable; prone to change or recede from a purpose; mutable; inconstant.
imp. & p. p.
of Sable
v. t.
To form into a table or catalogue; to tabulate; as, to table fines.
n.
The fur of the sable.
n.
The company assembled round a table.
a.
Being of reasonable or suitable size; as, sizable timber; sizable bulk.
n.
A stable keeper.
a.
Liable to, or subjected by law to, taxation; as, ratable estate.
n.
The fiber of wool, cotton, flax, or the like; as, a coarse staple; a fine staple; a long or short staple.
imp. & p. p.
of Stable
adv.
In a stable manner; firmly; fixedly; steadily; as, a government stably settled.
a.
Pertaining to, or being market of staple for, commodities; as, a staple town.
v. i.
A house, shed, or building, for beasts to lodge and feed in; esp., a building or apartment with stalls, for horses; as, a horse stable; a cow stable.
v. i.
To dwell or lodge in a stable; to dwell in an inclosed place; to kennel.
v. t.
To put or keep in a stable.
v. i.
Firmly established; not easily moved, shaken, or overthrown; fixed; as, a stable government.