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EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY

  • Evolutionarily stable strategy
  • Solution concept in game theory

    An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy (or set of strategies) that is impermeable when adopted by a population in adaptation to a specific

    Evolutionarily stable strategy

    Evolutionarily_stable_strategy

  • Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
  • A weak evolutionarily stable strategy (WESS) is a more broad form of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Like ESS, a WESS is able to defend against an

    Weak evolutionarily stable strategy

    Weak_evolutionarily_stable_strategy

  • Evolutionarily stable state
  • Condition where selection restores genetic composition

    stability. While related to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), evolutionarily stable states are not identical and the two terms cannot

    Evolutionarily stable state

    Evolutionarily_stable_state

  • Evolutionarily stable set
  • Set of strategies in game theory

    In game theory an evolutionarily stable set (ES set), sometimes referred to as evolutionary stable sets, is a set of strategies, which score equally against

    Evolutionarily stable set

    Evolutionarily_stable_set

  • Chicken (game)
  • Model of conflict for two players in game theory

    chooses between the two pure strategies. Either the pure, or mixed, Nash equilibria will be evolutionarily stable strategies depending upon whether uncorrelated

    Chicken (game)

    Chicken_(game)

  • Minimax
  • Decision rule used for minimizing the possible loss for a worst-case scenario

    players will realize the difficulty of making a choice. So a more stable strategy is needed. Some choices are dominated by others and can be eliminated:

    Minimax

    Minimax

  • War of attrition (game)
  • Game theory model of aggression

    model was originally formulated by John Maynard Smith; a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was determined by Bishop & Cannings. An example is a second

    War of attrition (game)

    War_of_attrition_(game)

  • Stable matching problem
  • Pairing where no unchosen pair prefers each other over their choice

    mathematics, economics, and computer science, the stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized sets of elements

    Stable matching problem

    Stable_matching_problem

  • Evolutionary game theory
  • Application of game theory to evolving populations in biology

    Evolutionarily Stable Strategies with Two Types of Players J. Appl. Prob. 16, 76–83. Taylor, P. D., and Jonker, L. B. (1978). Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

    Evolutionary game theory

    Evolutionary_game_theory

  • Prisoner's dilemma
  • Standard example in game theory

    been shown that unfair ZD strategies are not evolutionarily stable. The key intuition is that an evolutionarily stable strategy must not only be able to

    Prisoner's dilemma

    Prisoner's_dilemma

  • Alternative mating strategy
  • different mating strategies to achieve reproductive success. The result over time is a variety of evolutionarily stable strategies and phenotypes, consisting

    Alternative mating strategy

    Alternative_mating_strategy

  • Nash equilibrium
  • Solution concept of a non-cooperative game

    there is a stable average frequency with which each pure strategy is employed by the average member of the appropriate population, then this stable average

    Nash equilibrium

    Nash_equilibrium

  • John von Neumann
  • Hungarian and American mathematician and physicist (1903–1957)

    Uchaikin, Vladimir V.; Zolotarev, Vladimir M. (1999). Chance and Stability: Stable Distributions and their Applications. De Gruyter. pp. xviii, 281, 424. doi:10

    John von Neumann

    John von Neumann

    John_von_Neumann

  • Game theory
  • Mathematical models of strategic interactions

    largely as a result of the work of John Maynard Smith and his evolutionarily stable strategy. In addition, the concepts of correlated equilibrium, trembling

    Game theory

    Game_theory

  • Tragedy of the commons
  • Overuse of a shared resource

    these classes and distinguish between psychological individual differences (stable personality traits) and situational factors (the environment). Situational

    Tragedy of the commons

    Tragedy of the commons

    Tragedy_of_the_commons

  • Rock paper scissors
  • Hand game for two players or more

    & Walker, Graham (2004) The Official Rock Paper Scissors Strategy Guide. Fireside. (strategy, tips and culture from the World Rock Paper Scissors Society)

    Rock paper scissors

    Rock paper scissors

    Rock_paper_scissors

  • Strategy (game theory)
  • Complete plan on how a game player will behave in every possible game situation

    extended form games. Nash equilibrium Haven (graph theory) Evolutionarily stable strategy Ben Polak Game Theory: Lecture 1 Transcript ECON 159, 5 September

    Strategy (game theory)

    Strategy_(game_theory)

  • Evolutionary invasion analysis
  • Mathematical modelling of phenotypic evolution

    where finite evolutionary steps lead past the local 'flatness'. Second, a fitness maximum which is known as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and which

    Evolutionary invasion analysis

    Evolutionary_invasion_analysis

  • Strategic dominance
  • Quality of a strategy in game theory

    In game theory, a strategy A dominates another strategy B if A will always produce a better result than B, regardless of how any other player plays. Some

    Strategic dominance

    Strategic_dominance

  • Coordination game
  • Simultaneous game found in game theory

    Unlike the pure Nash equilibria, the mixed equilibrium is not an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). The mixed Nash equilibrium is also Pareto dominated by

    Coordination game

    Coordination_game

  • Stag hunt
  • Conflict between safety and cooperation

    two pure strategy Nash equilibria, that is, stable attractors where an individual player can't improve their position with a different strategy if the other

    Stag hunt

    Stag_hunt

  • Pareto efficiency
  • Weakly optimal allocation of resources

    way possible. In terms of game theory, a strategy profile s is Pareto efficient when there is no other strategy profile s′ such that ui(s′) ≥ ui(s) for

    Pareto efficiency

    Pareto_efficiency

  • Alpha–beta pruning
  • Search algorithm

    Since the minimax algorithm and its variants are inherently depth-first, a strategy such as iterative deepening is usually used in conjunction with alpha–beta

    Alpha–beta pruning

    Alpha–beta_pruning

  • Evolutionary dynamics
  • Modelling evolution using differential equations

    applications across evolutionary biology. An important concept of evolutionary game theory as applied in biology is the evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. This

    Evolutionary dynamics

    Evolutionary_dynamics

  • Paradox of tolerance
  • Logical paradox in decision-making theory

    Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 86(344), 346–359. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30091841 Blumner, Robyn E. (August–September 2016). "Is My Intolerance of

    Paradox of tolerance

    Paradox of tolerance

    Paradox_of_tolerance

  • Tic-tac-toe
  • Paper-and-pencil game for two players

    often played by young children who may not have discovered the optimal strategy. Because of the simplicity of tic-tac-toe, it is often used as a pedagogical

    Tic-tac-toe

    Tic-tac-toe

    Tic-tac-toe

  • Solution concept
  • Formal rule for predicting how a game will be played

    Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition.[1] Hines, W. G. S. (1987) Evolutionary stable strategies: a review of basic theory. Theoretical Population Biology 31:195–272

    Solution concept

    Solution concept

    Solution_concept

  • Quantum game theory
  • Academic discipline

    initial states, Quantum entanglement of initial states, Superposition of strategies to be used on the initial states. This theory is based on the physics

    Quantum game theory

    Quantum_game_theory

  • Zero-sum game
  • Situation where total gains match total losses

    point-loss independent of the opponent's strategy. This leads to a linear programming problem with the optimal strategies for each player. This minimax method

    Zero-sum game

    Zero-sum_game

  • Best response
  • Concept in game theory

    know which one of them is which, then the mixed Nash is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), as play is confined to the bottom left to top right diagonal

    Best response

    Best_response

  • Appeasement
  • Diplomatic policy of concessions

    War as a "post revisionist" study. Appeasement was a crisis management strategy seeking a peaceful settlement of Hitler's grievances. "Chamberlain's worst

    Appeasement

    Appeasement

    Appeasement

  • Behavioral ecology
  • Study of the evolutionary basis for animal behavior due to ecological pressures

    behaviors such as this, it can evolve a stable pattern of behaviors known as an evolutionarily stable strategy (or ESS). This term, derived from economic

    Behavioral ecology

    Behavioral ecology

    Behavioral_ecology

  • Conflict resolution
  • Facilitating a peaceful outcome to a dispute

    necessary for survival, giving it a strong evolutionary value. A further focus of this is among species that have stable social units, individual relationships

    Conflict resolution

    Conflict_resolution

  • Daniel Kahneman
  • Israeli-American psychologist and economist (1934–2024)

    state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken

    Daniel Kahneman

    Daniel Kahneman

    Daniel_Kahneman

  • Mertens-stable equilibrium
  • Solution concept for non-cooperative games

    strategies and payoffs. Decomposition and Player Splitting. The stable sets of the product of two independent games are the products of their stable sets

    Mertens-stable equilibrium

    Mertens-stable_equilibrium

  • Farsightedness (game theory)
  • Concept in game theory involving long-term strategic planning

    adaptation, where strategies adjust based on immediate fitness. A farsighted strategy might aim for an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) that withstands

    Farsightedness (game theory)

    Farsightedness_(game_theory)

  • Bayesian game
  • Game theory concept

    (non-Bayesian) game, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if every player's strategy is a best response to the other players' strategies. In this situation

    Bayesian game

    Bayesian_game

  • De-escalation
  • Decrease in severity of conflicts

    place in 1983. In war-time diplomacy, de-escalation is used as an exit strategy, sometimes called an "off-ramp" or "slip road". In such cases, an alternative

    De-escalation

    De-escalation

    De-escalation

  • Combinatorial game theory
  • Branch of game theory about two-player sequential games with perfect information

    analysis of game complexity and the existence of optimal strategies through methods like the strategy-stealing argument. Combinatorial game theory arose in

    Combinatorial game theory

    Combinatorial game theory

    Combinatorial_game_theory

  • Stable roommates problem
  • Type of stable matching problem

    combinatorial game theory and algorithms, the stable-roommate problem (SRP) is the problem of finding a stable matching for an even-sized set. A matching

    Stable roommates problem

    Stable_roommates_problem

  • The Selfish Gene
  • 1976 book by Richard Dawkins

    Smith’s evolutionarily stable strategy, "a strategy which, if most members of a population adopt it, cannot be bettered by an alternative strategy … once

    The Selfish Gene

    The_Selfish_Gene

  • Escalation of commitment
  • Human behavior pattern in which the participant takes on increasing risk

    when subjects view current issues as having unstable reasoning rather than stable reasoning, or when the individual is unwilling to admit mistakes. They then

    Escalation of commitment

    Escalation_of_commitment

  • Evolutionary attractor
  • Point in evolutionary space where selection always leads

    selection, such as an evolutionarily stable strategy, other possibilities are available. Because identification of an evolutionary attractor on its own

    Evolutionary attractor

    Evolutionary_attractor

  • Signalling theory
  • Theory in evolutionary biology

    Mathematical models describe how signalling can contribute to an evolutionarily stable strategy. Signals are given in contexts such as mate selection by females

    Signalling theory

    Signalling theory

    Signalling_theory

  • Folk theorem (game theory)
  • Class of theorems about Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games

    player's choices in the prior iterations. A choice of strategy for each of the players is a strategy profile, and it leads to a payout profile for the repeated

    Folk theorem (game theory)

    Folk_theorem_(game_theory)

  • Win–win game
  • Game theory scenario

    state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken

    Win–win game

    Win–win_game

  • Peace and conflict studies
  • Field in social science

    Appeasement in a strategy of making political, material, or territorial concessions to an aggressive power to avoid conflict. Deterrence is a strategy to use threats

    Peace and conflict studies

    Peace and conflict studies

    Peace_and_conflict_studies

  • Ultimatum game
  • Game in economic experiments

    can adopt a strategy that rejects unfair splits often enough to induce the proposer to always make a fair offer. Any change in strategy by the proposer

    Ultimatum game

    Ultimatum game

    Ultimatum_game

  • Rationalizable strategy
  • Solution concept in game theory

    are also somewhat rational, i.e. that they do not play dominated strategies. A strategy is rationalizable if there exists some possible set of beliefs both

    Rationalizable strategy

    Rationalizable_strategy

  • Chopsticks (hand game)
  • Hand game for two or more players

    combinatorial game, and is solved in the sense that, with perfect play, an optimal strategy from any point is known. In Chopsticks, players tally points using the

    Chopsticks (hand game)

    Chopsticks (hand game)

    Chopsticks_(hand_game)

  • Focal point (game theory)
  • Concept in game theory

    introduced by the American economist Thomas Schelling in his book The Strategy of Conflict (1960). Schelling states that "[p]eople can often concert their

    Focal point (game theory)

    Focal_point_(game_theory)

  • Determinacy
  • Subfield of set theory

    the other player of a game has a winning strategy, and the consequences of the existence of such strategies. Alternatively and similarly, "determinacy"

    Determinacy

    Determinacy

  • Cooperative game theory
  • Game where groups of players may enforce cooperative behaviour

    unique vector. The core is contained in any stable set, and if the core is stable it is the unique stable set; see (Driessen 1988) for a proof. For simple

    Cooperative game theory

    Cooperative_game_theory

  • List of games in game theory
  • unilaterally change their strategy. Considering only situations where players play a single strategy without randomizing (a pure strategy) a game can have any

    List of games in game theory

    List_of_games_in_game_theory

  • Replicator equation
  • Dynamical system

    ISBN 978-0-674-02338-3. Alboszta, Jan; Miękisz, Jacek (2004). "Stability of evolutionarily stable strategies in discrete replicator dynamicswithtimedelay". Journal of Theoretical

    Replicator equation

    Replicator_equation

  • Arrow's impossibility theorem
  • Proof all ranked voting rules have spoilers

    to occur in practice. Holliday, Wesley H.; Pacuit, Eric (2023-03-14). "Stable Voting". Constitutional Political Economy. 34 (3): 421–433. arXiv:2108.00542

    Arrow's impossibility theorem

    Arrow's_impossibility_theorem

  • Homo economicus
  • Model of humans as rational, self-interested agents

    discussion. In its standard formulation, the model assumes that individuals have stable preferences, access to relevant information, and seek to maximize utility

    Homo economicus

    Homo_economicus

  • Two-level game theory
  • Political model of international conflict resolution

    state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken

    Two-level game theory

    Two-level game theory

    Two-level_game_theory

  • Complete information
  • Level of information in economics and game theory

    participants. The utility functions (including risk aversion), payoffs, strategies and "types" of players are thus common knowledge. Complete information

    Complete information

    Complete information

    Complete_information

  • Shapley value
  • Concept in game theory

    state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken

    Shapley value

    Shapley value

    Shapley_value

  • Solved game
  • Game whose outcome can be correctly predicted

    both players play perfectly. This concept is usually applied to abstract strategy games, and especially to games with full information and no element of

    Solved game

    Solved_game

  • Coopetition
  • Neologism for cooperative competition

    term is a portmanteau of "cooperation" and "competition". In business strategy, coopetition can involve companies collaborating in areas like research

    Coopetition

    Coopetition

  • Dynamic inconsistency
  • When a decision-maker's future preferences can contradict earlier preferences

    JSTOR 1885679. Simaan, M.; Cruz, J. B. Jr. (1973a). "On the Stackelberg Strategy in Nonzero-Sum Games". Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

    Dynamic inconsistency

    Dynamic_inconsistency

  • Trigger strategy
  • Class of strategies employed in a repeated non-cooperative game

    theory, a trigger strategy is any of a class of strategies employed in a repeated non-cooperative game. A player using a trigger strategy initially cooperates

    Trigger strategy

    Trigger_strategy

  • No-win situation
  • Situation where all parties are worse off

    state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken

    No-win situation

    No-win_situation

  • Bertrand competition
  • Economic model of competition

    to find out a solution in pure strategies in Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs. Ha has defined the Myopic Stable Set (MSS)for Normal-form games

    Bertrand competition

    Bertrand_competition

  • Frozen Evolution
  • 2008 book by Jaroslav Flegr

    speciation. It also draws upon John Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy. Biologist Brian K. Hall described the book as broad and integrative

    Frozen Evolution

    Frozen_Evolution

  • Game complexity
  • Notion in combinatorial game theory

    quantity; but it is usually known to be linear). The depth-first minimax strategy will use computation time proportional to the game's tree-complexity (since

    Game complexity

    Game_complexity

  • Perfect information
  • Condition in economics and game theory

    implies common knowledge of each agent's utility functions, payoffs, strategies and "types". A system with perfect information may or may not have complete

    Perfect information

    Perfect information

    Perfect_information

  • Bishop–Cannings theorem
  • Bishop–Cannings theorem is a theorem in evolutionary game theory. It states that (i) all members of a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) have the same payoff

    Bishop–Cannings theorem

    Bishop–Cannings_theorem

  • Signaling game
  • Game class in game theory

    {\displaystyle m} . The receiver's strategy is a choice of P r o b ( a | m ) . {\displaystyle Prob(a|m).} The sender's strategy is a choice of P r o b ( m |

    Signaling game

    Signaling game

    Signaling_game

  • Conjectural variation
  • the Evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. As the authors argued, "Beliefs determine Behavior. Behavior determines payoff. From an evolutionary perspective

    Conjectural variation

    Conjectural_variation

  • Parrondo's paradox
  • Paradox of combining strategies

    in game theory, describes how a combination of losing strategies can become a winning strategy. It is named after its creator, Juan Parrondo, who discovered

    Parrondo's paradox

    Parrondo's_paradox

  • Kuhn poker
  • Poker game developed by Harold Kuhn

    the other player). The game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; when both players play equilibrium strategies, the first player should expect to lose

    Kuhn poker

    Kuhn_poker

  • Cooperative bargaining
  • Problem in process of sharing surplus

    neither player can increase their return by unilaterally changing their strategy. In Rubinstein's alternating offers bargaining game, players take turns

    Cooperative bargaining

    Cooperative_bargaining

  • Group selection
  • Proposed mechanism of evolution

    different groups, each with a different evolutionarily stable strategy, there is selection between the different strategies, since some are worse than others

    Group selection

    Group selection

    Group_selection

  • Amos Tversky
  • Israeli psychologist (1937–1996)

    state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken

    Amos Tversky

    Amos_Tversky

  • Social norm
  • Informal understanding of acceptable conduct

    calculations. Others see social norms emerging as part of an evolutionarily stable strategy, where they stabilize through third-party punishment. Three

    Social norm

    Social_norm

  • Stackelberg competition
  • Economic model

    equilibrium or equilibria (SPNE), i.e. the strategy profile that serves best each player, given the strategies of the other player and that entails every

    Stackelberg competition

    Stackelberg_competition

  • Tyranny of small decisions
  • Economic phenomenon

    inappropriate levels can introduce. Creeping normality Externality Fabian strategy Fredkin's paradox Free rider problem Greedy algorithm Law of triviality

    Tyranny of small decisions

    Tyranny_of_small_decisions

  • Bounded rationality
  • Making of satisfactory, not optimal, decisions

    seen when comparing the cognitive strategies utilised in simple situations (e.g. tic-tac-toe), in comparison to strategies utilised in difficult situations

    Bounded rationality

    Bounded_rationality

  • Mechanism design
  • Field of economics and game theory

    such a setting because it involves solving for agents' best-response strategies and for the best inference from a possible strategic lie. Thanks to a

    Mechanism design

    Mechanism design

    Mechanism_design

  • Stochastic game
  • Concept in game theory

    \varepsilon >0} there is a positive integer N {\displaystyle N} and a strategy pair σ ε {\displaystyle \sigma _{\varepsilon }} of player 1 and τ ε {\displaystyle

    Stochastic game

    Stochastic_game

  • Third-party punishment
  • punishments are the essence of social norms, as they are an evolutionarily stable strategy, unlike second-party punishments. It has also been shown that

    Third-party punishment

    Third-party_punishment

  • Fisher's principle
  • Evolutionary model that explains the sex ratio

    equilibrium ratio. In modern language, the 1:1 ratio is the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Fisher wrote the explanation described by Eric Charnov

    Fisher's principle

    Fisher's_principle

  • Pirate game
  • Simple mathematical game

    state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken

    Pirate game

    Pirate_game

  • Solving chess
  • Finding an optimal algorithm for playing chess

    Solving chess consists of finding an optimal strategy for the game of chess; that is, one by which one of the players (White or Black) can always force

    Solving chess

    Solving_chess

  • Core (game theory)
  • Set in game theory

    coalition having at least (n+1)/2 members has an empty core. That is, no stable coalition exists. Consider a group of n miners, who have discovered large

    Core (game theory)

    Core_(game_theory)

  • Negamax
  • Variation of minimax game tree search

    state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy Games Chicken

    Negamax

    Negamax

  • Cournot competition
  • Economic model

    and then behaves as a monopoly. The state of equilibrium... is therefore stable; i.e., if either of the producers, misled as to his true interest, leaves

    Cournot competition

    Cournot_competition

  • Normal-form game
  • Representation of a game in game theory

    players' strategy spaces and payoff functions. A strategy space for a player is the set of all strategies available to that player, whereas a strategy is a

    Normal-form game

    Normal-form_game

  • Tit for tat
  • English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation"

    recorded in 1558. It is also a highly effective strategy in game theory. An agent using this strategy will first cooperate, then subsequently replicate

    Tit for tat

    Tit for tat

    Tit_for_tat

  • ESS
  • Topics referred to by the same term

    nuclear research facility Euthyroid sick syndrome Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Explained sum of squares Effective sample size

    ESS

    ESS

  • Ambiguity aversion
  • Preference of known risks to unknown risks

    the range 60-260. For some values of x, the safe strategy (option R) is dominated by a mixed strategy of L and M, and thus would not be played in a Nash

    Ambiguity aversion

    Ambiguity_aversion

  • Fair division
  • Problem of sharing resources

    fair division procedure be strategyproof, i.e. it should be a dominant strategy for the participants to report their true valuations. This requirement

    Fair division

    Fair division

    Fair_division

  • Sprague–Grundy theorem
  • Combinatorial game theory theorem

    has a winning strategy for A + G + H {\displaystyle A+G+H} : respond to moves in A {\displaystyle A} according to their winning strategy for A {\displaystyle

    Sprague–Grundy theorem

    Sprague–Grundy_theorem

  • Dictator game
  • Experimental tool

    CiteSeerX 10.1.1.47.229. doi:10.1007/s001820050072. S2CID 6044302. Watson, Joel. Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. Vol. 139. New York. Camerer, Colin; Thaler

    Dictator game

    Dictator_game

  • Battle of the sexes (game theory)
  • Two-player coordination game in game theory

    pure strategy Nash equilibria, one where both players go to the prize fight, and another where both go to the ballet. There is also a mixed strategy Nash

    Battle of the sexes (game theory)

    Battle_of_the_sexes_(game_theory)

  • Markov strategy
  • Strategy which only depends on the current state of a game

    In game theory, a Markov strategy is a strategy that depends only on the current state of the game, rather than the full history of past actions. The state

    Markov strategy

    Markov_strategy

  • Blotto game
  • Resource distribution game

    optimal strategies can be explicitly found. In addition to military strategy applications, the Colonel Blotto game has applications to political strategy (resource

    Blotto game

    Blotto_game

AI & ChatGPT searchs for online references containing EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY

AI search references containing EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY

  • Stobbe
  • Surname or Lastname

    English, Dutch, North German, and Danish

    Stobbe

    English, Dutch, North German, and Danish : variant of Stubbe.

    Stobbe

  • Stabley
  • Surname or Lastname

    English (Durham)

    Stabley

    English (Durham) : unexplained

    Stabley

  • Stabler
  • Surname or Lastname

    English

    Stabler

    English : occupational name for someone who looked after horses or cattle, from an agent derivative of Middle English stable ‘stable’.German (Stäbler) : occupational name for an official who carried a staff as a symbol of office, Middle High German stebelære.

    Stabler

  • Dhruvak | த்ருவக
  • Boy/Male

    Tamil

    Dhruvak | த்ருவக

    Stable

    Dhruvak | த்ருவக

  • STACEE
  • Female

    English

    STACEE

    Feminine variant spelling of English unisex Stacey, STACEE means "resurrection."

    STACEE

  • STACIE
  • Female

    English

    STACIE

    Feminine variant spelling of English unisex Stacey, STACIE means "resurrection."

    STACIE

  • Dinh
  • Boy/Male

    Vietnamese

    Dinh

    Stable.

    Dinh

  • Stables
  • Surname or Lastname

    English

    Stables

    English : topographic name for someone who lived by a stable, or an occupational name for someone employed in one, from Middle English stable, plural stables (via Old French from Latin stabulum, a derivative of stare ‘to stand’). In Middle English the term was used of the quarters occupied by cattle as well as those reserved for horses.

    Stables

  • Staples
  • Surname or Lastname

    English

    Staples

    English : variant of Staple.

    Staples

  • SABLE
  • Female

    English

    SABLE

    English name derived from the vocabulary word, SABLE means "black," as a heraldic color. It is sometimes confused with the mammal of the same name but which has brown fur, not black, and which has a different origin.

    SABLE

  • Stanley
  • Boy/Male

    Shakespearean American English

    Stanley

    Henry VI, Part 2' Sir John Stanley. 'King Henry the Sixth, Part III' Sir William Stanley. 'King...

    Stanley

  • Dhruvak
  • Boy/Male

    Hindu

    Dhruvak

    Stable

    Dhruvak

  • AMABLE
  • Male

    French

    AMABLE

    French name derived from Latin amabilis, AMABLE means "lovable."

    AMABLE

  • Mithyl
  • Boy/Male

    Indian, Sanskrit

    Mithyl

    Stable

    Mithyl

  • MABLE
  • Female

    English

    MABLE

    Variant spelling of English Mabel, MABLE means "lovable." 

    MABLE

  • Scoble
  • Surname or Lastname

    English (Devon and Cornwall)

    Scoble

    English (Devon and Cornwall) : habitational name from Scoble in Devon.

    Scoble

  • Stapler
  • Surname or Lastname

    English

    Stapler

    English : topographic name for someone who lived near a boundary post, from Middle English stapel ‘post’ + the suffix -er, denoting an inhabitant.

    Stapler

  • Adol
  • Boy/Male

    Indian, Punjabi, Sikh

    Adol

    Stable

    Adol

  • STARLA
  • Female

    English

    STARLA

    Elaborated form of English Star, STARLA means "star."

    STARLA

  • Staple
  • Surname or Lastname

    English

    Staple

    English : from Middle English stapel ‘post’, hence a topographic name for someone who lived near a boundary post, or a habitational name from some place named with this word (Old English stapel), as for example Staple in Kent or Staple Fitzpaine in Somerset.Americanized spelling of German Stapel.

    Staple

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Online names & meanings

  • Ekanayaka
  • Boy/Male

    Indian, Sanskrit

    Ekanayaka

    Sole Leader; Lord Shiva

  • Tausiq
  • Boy/Male

    Arabic, Hindu, Indian, Kannada, Marathi, Muslim, Telugu

    Tausiq

    Reinforcement

  • JOOLS
  • Female

    English

    JOOLS

    Variant spelling of English Jules, JOOLS means "descended from Jupiter (Jove)."

  • Bhodhisatva
  • Boy/Male

    Hindu, Indian, Marathi

    Bhodhisatva

    Buddha

  • Rutansh | ருதாஂஷ 
  • Boy/Male

    Tamil

    Rutansh | ருதாஂஷ 

  • Luz
  • Boy/Male

    Biblical

    Luz

    Separation, departure, an almond.

  • Machir
  • Biblical

    Machir

    selling; knowing

  • Murji
  • Boy/Male

    Gujarati, Hindu, Indian

    Murji

    Brave

  • Silverthorn
  • Surname or Lastname

    English (mainly Bristol and Gwent)

    Silverthorn

    English (mainly Bristol and Gwent) : of uncertain origin, apparently a habitational name from some lost or unidentified place deriving its name from Old English seolfor ‘silver’ + þorn ‘thorn bush’.

  • Verdon
  • Surname or Lastname

    French

    Verdon

    French : habitational name from a place so named, for example in Dordogne, Gironde, and Marne.English : variant of Verdun.A Verdon, also written Verdun, from the Aunis region of France was documented in Quebec City in 1663.

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Other words and meanings similar to

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY

AI search in online dictionary sources & meanings containing EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE-STRATEGY

  • Staple
  • v. t.

    To sort according to its staple; as, to staple cotton.

  • Stable
  • v. i.

    Durable; not subject to overthrow or change; firm; as, a stable foundation; a stable position.

  • Evolutionary
  • a.

    Relating to evolution; as, evolutionary discussions.

  • Staled
  • imp. & p. p.

    of Stale

  • Instable
  • a.

    Not stable; not standing fast or firm; unstable; prone to change or recede from a purpose; mutable; inconstant.

  • Sabled
  • imp. & p. p.

    of Sable

  • Table
  • v. t.

    To form into a table or catalogue; to tabulate; as, to table fines.

  • Sable
  • n.

    The fur of the sable.

  • Table
  • n.

    The company assembled round a table.

  • Sizable
  • a.

    Being of reasonable or suitable size; as, sizable timber; sizable bulk.

  • Stabler
  • n.

    A stable keeper.

  • Ratable
  • a.

    Liable to, or subjected by law to, taxation; as, ratable estate.

  • Staple
  • n.

    The fiber of wool, cotton, flax, or the like; as, a coarse staple; a fine staple; a long or short staple.

  • Stabled
  • imp. & p. p.

    of Stable

  • Stably
  • adv.

    In a stable manner; firmly; fixedly; steadily; as, a government stably settled.

  • Staple
  • a.

    Pertaining to, or being market of staple for, commodities; as, a staple town.

  • Stable
  • v. i.

    A house, shed, or building, for beasts to lodge and feed in; esp., a building or apartment with stalls, for horses; as, a horse stable; a cow stable.

  • Stable
  • v. i.

    To dwell or lodge in a stable; to dwell in an inclosed place; to kennel.

  • Stable
  • v. t.

    To put or keep in a stable.

  • Stable
  • v. i.

    Firmly established; not easily moved, shaken, or overthrown; fixed; as, a stable government.